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The unresolved reconciliation process for WWII South Korean military “comfort women” presents a case of nationally 
inherited collective trauma, in which South Koreans far removed in time and space from the historical tragedy feel its 
implications and obligations for reparations and social healing. In examining the South Korean comfort women redress 
movement and systemic concealment of WWII military sexual slavery, this study investigates a pattern of victim 
silencing, characterized by institutional patriarchy and ineffective government involvement, from 1945 to 2019. 
Following the South Korean government’s formal rejection of the 2015 agreement with Japan regarding a final and 
irreversible conclusion to the comfort women issue, South Korean and international women’s rights organizations 
have openly addressed a need for new reconciliation efforts with Japan; however, the current stance of the South 
Korean government, under President Moon Jae-in, remains hesitant to seek a renegotiation. Based on the effective 
methods of democratic reparations from South Africa, Germany, and the United States, this study proposes a new 
victim-centered approach to the reconciliation of collective trauma through the role of the South Korean government. 
The new approach encompasses the following: (1) organizing an official collection of victim testimonies, (2) fostering 
government relationships with women’s rights organizations, and (3) instating sexual violence education in university 
settings in order to facilitate long-term social healing. 
 




On January 9, 2018, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha announced the South Korean government’s 
rejection of the 2015 bilateral deal for the issue of South Korean comfort women as a “true” resolution of the issue of 
Japanese wartime sexual slavery.13 The 2015 agreement, which allowed for a Japanese donation of ¥1 billion ($8.8 
million USD) in exchange for a final and irreversible conclusion to the issue, served the purpose of acting as the last 
official deal between the Japanese and South Korean government regarding the issue of WWII comfort women. While 
Kang acknowledged the deal as an official agreement between the two countries, Kang expressed the South Korean 
government’s call for a genuine apology from the Japanese government that restores the “honor and dignity of victims 
and heals the wounds in their hearts,” suggesting that the trauma of former comfort women has yet to be healed and 
requires present action in order to do so.13 The continuation of the conversation between the Japanese and South 
Korean government in 2018 indicates an ongoing issue of the unresolved reconciliation of South Korean military 
comfort women. 
   World War II Japanese military “comfort women” refer to estimated 200,000 women who were coercively recruited 
by the Japanese imperial army during WWII under the banner of Chongsindae (“Voluntary” Labor Service Corps). 
Although the euphemistic phrase “comfort women” might suggest prostitution, these women were not military 
prostitutes, but forced sexual slaves who were used to supply Japanese comfort stations. The term “comfort women” 
will be used throughout this paper due to the term’s international recognition in Korea (위안부), in Japan (慰安婦), 
and in global mass media. According to Lay and Ward in a 2016 study of the international reaction to the comfort 
women controversy, approximately 80% of these women were Korean, contributing to the active call for a Japanese-
Korean reconciliation of military sexual slavery since the conclusion of WWII.19  
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   The unresolved reconciliation process for the issue of South Korean comfort women presents a case of nationally 
inherited collective trauma, in which South Koreans removed from the historical tragedy feel its burdens and 
obligations for healing. Inherited collective trauma, or the recollection of a tragedy in the collective memory of a 
group, correlates to a deficit in the social healing process of an entity: individual and group healing in which the 
ultimate goal lies in the social justice and sustainability within a society. Since 2018, the South Korean government 
has formally rejected the latest Japanese-Korean accord. Thus, there is a need to facilitate a new means of social 
healing, ending the influence of cultural silencing and extending women’s rights impacts in present-day sexual 
violence governmental actions. 
   Existing background and historical literature have examined the nature of the issue in relation to South Korean 
nationalism and feminism, the relationship between Korea and Japan, and the direct psychological impacts on victims. 
The abundant discussion has primarily focused on characterizing the historical truth in reference to the international 
clashes after WWII, rather than addressing inherited responsibilities and legacies and the trajectory of women’s 
movements and activism. This paper’s purpose is to investigate the aspects of the reconciliation process through the 
role of cultural and sociopolitical silencing in the late 1900s and early 2000s. This perspective, which assembles 
previous actions and attempts for reparations by the South Korean government, is necessary to understand the issue 
as a dynamic and restituted phenomenon in South Korea. Through an analysis of reparation methods from Germany, 
South Africa, and the United States, this paper will propose a new approach for the reconciliation of the collective 
trauma of the WWII comfort system through the role of the South Korean government. 
 
2. Inherited Collective Trauma of South Korean Comfort Women 
 
The inherited collective trauma from the WWII Japanese comfort system exists in modern-day South Korea; Koreans 
far removed in time and space from the historical tragedy feel the societal impacts and obligations for the reconciliation 
and social healing of comfort women. 
   In a 2018 Israeli study focused on defining international inherited trauma and post-traumatic worldviews, 
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya researcher Hirschberger states that collective trauma, sometimes referred to as 
cultural trauma, is the recollection of a tragedy in the collective memory of a group persisting beyond the lives of 
direct survivors and remembered by group members far removed in time and space.10 Hirschberger claims that 
collective trauma is a dynamic process–an ongoing reconstruction of past events that take on different shapes and 
forms from generation to generation. Hirschberger’s definition of inherited collective trauma fits Lay and Ward’s 
description of the Japanese comfort system. According to Lay and Ward, the Japanese comfort system embodies the 
Imperial Army’s treatment of over 200,000 female South Korean adolescents the occupation between 1930 to 1945 
resulting in the creation of the systemic Japanese disempowerment of comfort women. This construction through time 
prompts a need to assess and construct collective meaning and social identity, a basis for intergroup understanding.10 
   The presence of collective trauma within an entity presents two factors: (1) a disruption in the collective identity 
and, thus, meaning and (2) an evolutionary form of vigilance to transcend a painful past.10 Following a model similar 
to Hirschberger’s, Stamm et al., in a 2004 study of cultural trauma and revitalization, state that when a group forms a 
collective trauma, the group begins to question its core values, creating way for new collective meaning, group 
adjustment, and historical presence.25 Collective trauma is evidenced in the racial trauma of Japanese-American 
internment camps, the aftermath of the apartheid in South Africa, and the systematic discrimination following the 
Civil War and American slavery, with each historical tragedy prompting a new set of social identity within a larger 
cohort or population. In a 1991 study of national identity in Equatorial Guinea, Cusack states that traumas are 
translated through changes in the national or population identity, prompting a property of inheritance among national 
and international traumas.6  
   The trauma of the “comfort system” is an example of a disruption in the coherence of the South Korean population 
that incited a new entity to take hold within the South Korean cultural views toward females, victimhood, sexual 
abuse, and human rights. Alexander, in a 2016 study of cultural trauma at Yale University, asserts that a culture trauma 
exists in South Korea after the colonial Japanese imperialism, leading to a lack of cohesive social identity within the 
nation in post-colonial periods.1 The lack of the governmental actions to address the impact and magnitude of such 
trauma bolstered the presence of an intergenerational, collective tragedy that persisted throughout generations, 
prompting a delayed but necessary means to address stigma attached to the WWII comfort system and sexual violence 
against women.   
 




Because the South Korean government failed to recognize the importance of reconciliation immediately following the 
end of the Japanese comfort system, the Korean society lacked the formal platform, criminal trials, and compensation 
from which healing from the trauma would and could occur. The missteps of the South Korean government enabled 
the sociopolitical silencing of the victims in formal reconciliation efforts. 
   Following the end of WWII in the 1940s and 50s, the newly-liberated Korea was divided into two spheres of 
influence, the Soviet Union in the North and the United States in the South.15 The South Korean government was 
focused on the teetering Korean War at the time, seeking to increase national and economic stability rather than to 
addressing the process of reconciliation for former comfort women. In a 1996 study about the Comfort Women redress 
movement, Soh also claims that former comfort women mostly came from rural and poor demographics before forced 
into servitude, bringing a level of illiteracy and poverty that contributed to their lack of political voice.24 The 
government’s immediate attention to Korea’s political stability, the demographics of former comfort women, and the 
inherent silence that comes with sexual violence cases led to the initial marginalization of comfort women. 
   In a 2009 study regarding post-WWII feminist nationalism in South Korea, Kim states that the South Korean 
authoritarian regime’s focus on the economy following WWII paved way for the organization of women during the 
1960s to the 1980s. During this time period, the South Korean government, under President Chunghee Park, adopted 
strategies that supported the rapid growth of a labor-based economy that lacked resources for the protection of female 
workers in the industry. As a countermovement, the women’s movement entered a new era, called the Second 
Movement, that sought for the “humanization” of women within a time of mass industrialization.14 In a 2003 study on 
the relationship between South Korean sexual violence and women’s movement, Jung claims that women’s rights 
organizations, such as the Christian Academy and the Korean Church Women United, rose up to establish protection 
against the growing economic disparity, destitution in urban and rural poverty, and rising class tension, bringing 
women into the collective voice against unsustainable nation development in 1965.12 Through these efforts, the 
Women Leaders’ Consultative meeting in 1974 officiated the Declaration on Women’s Humanization, stating that the 
unequal treatment of women in South Korea is the “most persistent and intractable barrier” to the progression of 
human liberation.27 The growth of the women’s movement in the late 1900s created a venue of female activism for 
the issue of comfort women, which took place in the 1980s and 90s.  
   Before the redress movement could gain momentum, however, the Korean government formulated one of the first 
international agreements for the issue of comfort women that actively silenced the voices of victims. In 1965, the 
South Korean government finalized the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims, 
a normalization treaty that settled WWII Korean conscript labor through $300 million in Japanese economic aid and 
$200 million in loans.11, 17 By initiating the executive decision to settle with the 1965 agreement, the South Korean 
government used the Japanese monetary donation as part of a national economic strategy, without addressing the 
victims of the military sexual slavery. Serving as one of the first attempts at reconciliation, the 1965 normalization 
agreement successfully stifled the formation of any conversation regarding the issue of former comfort women. The 
moral and legal conversation surrounding the reconciliation of the comfort women issue only later gained foothold 
when Yun Chung-Ok of Ewha Womans University presented the issue in relation to the foreign sex entertainment 
tourism (kisaeng) in contemporary Korea.24 Since the presentation in 1989, new women’s organizations, such as 
Korean Council for the Women Drafted into Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council), filed demands 
for the Japanese government to publicly apologize, investigate, and compensate accordingly but immediately faced 
rejection from Prime Minister Kaifu in 1990.24  
   In 1991, Kim Hak-sun filed a lawsuit against the Japanese for damages, becoming the first public former comfort 
woman. Following Kim, other former comfort women followed with individual lawsuits against the Japanese 
government but faced rejections to the notions of coercion and management of the comfort system until 1992 when 
Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki discovered incriminating documentation that confirmed the Japanese government’s direct 
involvement.24 Since Yoshiaki’s discovery, the Japanese government has made several attempts at reparations with 
the South Korean government, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato’s 1992 investigation of WWII 
government involvement, the 1993 Kono Agreement recognizing comfort women, and 1994 establishment of the 
Asian Women’s Fund (AWF).  
 
4. Confucianism and Cultural Silencing 
 
At the conclusion of World War II, the South Korean culture relied heavily on patriarchal Confucianism, leaving 
victims of the WWII comfort system to return to a “shaming” society without systematic support or encouragement 
for the victims to heal from the trauma. Thus, South Korea’s systemic reliance on Confucianism led to the cultural 
silencing of the former comfort women.  
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   In a 2019 study of the “Peace Girl” statue and related visual media for WWII comfort women, Kwon asserts that 
the postcolonial South Korean society relied heavily on the monoethnic, Confucian ideals that limited women’s 
influence to motherland and ethnic purity. By contrast, men were labelled as the fighters of “national enemies”, 
building inherently patriarchal nationalism that fueled the othering of women from the national conversation of the 
collective “we.”18 Through an analysis of South Korean gender discourse, Kim asserts that patriarchal nationalism is 
evident in the legality of South Korean laws, persisting through infrastructure of family law and the family-head 
system, referred to as the hoju system. Kim states that under the Constitutional hoju system, all South Korean citizens 
belonged to a family in which (1) the wife belongs to the husband’s family, (2) the children belong to the father’s 
family, and (3) the eldest son presumes responsibility of the family-headship. Thus, the South Korean government 
institutionalized concepts of patrilineal family and gender hierarchy through the male family-head system, in what 
Kwon calls “male-oriented nationalism.”18 A study of discrimination factors in the family head system by Yang 
furthers the collaboration between the state legal system and the patriarchal social order, claiming that the post-colonial 
patriarchal sexual culture interlocked with the nationalism served as a hidden backdrop for the period of silence that 
followed in South Korea.28  
   Former comfort women, no longer retaining ethnic chastity, returned to a shaming society that deemed their forced 
sexual services for foreigners as “defiling of the nation’s ethnic purity.”18 The increase in the popularity of this 
shaming culture in response to a foreign invasion has long been prevalent in South Korea. During the late 16 th century 
Japanese invasion of Korea, raped women committed suicide – their deaths referred to as an honorable “yolyo” – in 
order to preserve the image of the “virtuous women.” This followed into a series of silenced crimes with “raping 
robbers,” (kajong y’ agoebom) who took advantage of the Confucian outlook and raped women of a household in 
front of other members as security so the robbery would not be reported to authorities. Similarly, the returning comfort 
women faced the burden of Korea’s shaming culture and chose to remain quiet about their trauma, often resolving to 
find residence in a neighboring East Asian country (e.g. Japan, North Korea, China) or committing suicide24. The core 
of South Korea’s cultural norms became the foundation for the silencing of female victims following the fall of the 
comfort system, contributing to the fifty-year gap between the end of World War II and the first public testimony of 
a former “comfort woman,” Kim Hak-Sun. 
   Through a 2016 study with 16 of the 59 known South Korean survivors of the comfort women system, Park et al. 
claim that victims reported psychological issues that may have exacerbated the development trauma that the women 
suffered in the comfort system, resulting in subsequent trauma. In effect, Park et al. suggests that South Korean 
attitudes towards the victims, founded on the ideals of Confucianism, and respective cultural silencing became 
secondary effects of early-life trauma, prompting a larger scope of disenfranchisement.22  
 
5. Lack of Social Healing and Internal Cycle of Violence  
 
5. 1 Cycle of Violence 
 
South Korean comfort women suffered from long-term subjugation from the Korean government and societal 
traditions that created an essence of deep shame and humiliation within the marginalized group. A Pennsylvania State 
University study of defeat, national humiliation, and the revenge motif by Harkavy states that such depth of shame 
lent itself to an underlying cycle of “defeat, psychological humiliation or shame, and resultant quest for revenge” that 
is prevalent in ex-colonial peoples and national groups affiliated with military defeats.9 Harkavy’s implicit model of 
defeat, humiliation, and vengeance presents an understudied area of international relations that results in the aftermath 
of imperialism, colonization, and global conflict; Harkavy’s model is particularly relevant to groups deeply rooted in 
a “shame culture” – a mass tendency for conformity in fear of collective shaming. The defeat/revenge motif in foreign 
policy is evidenced in Ecuador’s defeat in the mini-war against Peru, Argentina’s historical grievance in its territorial 
defeat of the Falklands/Malvinas islands in 1982, and France’s loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in the 1870s and 
its impact on its role against Germany in World War I.9  
   Beyond the recent historical examples, the issue of South Korea comfort women in the late 1900s to early 2000s 
matches the description of Harkavy’s model. Kim Hak-Sun, the first comfort woman to come forward and sue the 
Japanese government, testified to the extreme feeling of ostracization from Korean society upon her return to her 
homeland after WWII, stating that “when I was younger, I felt so shameful.”  Kim furthered her testimony by stating 
that “the more I think about that [time], the stronger my anger and resentment become - it’s probably why I have 
trouble breathing from time to time” (Korean Center for Investigative Journalism). Through a deeply engrained sense 
of defeat in the forced sexual slavery of adolescent females throughout WWII and the resulting shame due to the 
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prevailing culture of monolithic Confucianism and traditions at the time, the issue of comfort women lends itself to a 
cycle of revenge and violence.  
   The case of the “revenge motif” within the sphere of South Korean comfort women is most directly aimed at and 
related to the South Korean government. Reconciliation efforts on behalf of the comfort women have repeatedly left 
out the voice of the victims as seen through the Treaty of Basic Relations in 1965. This is further demonstrated in the 
acceptance of the 1994 Asian Women’s Fund that sparked controversy in its use of private rather than public 
government funds, the 2011 Korean Constitutional Court decision stating that the government had a duty to pursue 
re-negotiations with the Japanese government regarding the issue of comfort women, and the 2018 review committee’s 
decision that rejected the 2015 accord between Abe Shinzo and President Park Geunhye.  
   Furthermore, the failure to consider and acknowledge the voice of the arising comfort women movements in South 
Korea may result in accumulation of disenfranchisement on behalf of the South Korean government, as exemplified 
in Israel’s failure to predict Arab’s 1973 surprise onslaught due to “a lack of empathy among Israel’s leaders for the 
Egyptians’ and Syrians’ need to overcome past feelings of… damaged national honor.”9 Without a reconciliation of 
the defeat and shame in the issue of South Korean comfort women, a compulsion and need for reconciliation will 
continue to play a part in contemporary affairs, straining the relationship between the people and the government, and 
thus these values must not be alienated from current discussion of South Korean comfort women. 
 
5. 2 South Korean Rape Culture 
 
The missing social healing process has contributed to the current rape and sexual violence culture towards women in 
South Korea. Rape culture in South Korea embodies the complex relationships between gender, attitudes toward 
women, sexual double standards, and rape myth acceptance. Metacognitive scales, such as the Korean Rape Myth 
Acceptance Scale, the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, and the Sexual Double Standard Scale, quantitatively measure 
the perception of rape in South Korea, particularly focusing on rape myths: attitudes that are generally false but 
persistent that deny and justify sexual aggression against women.20 In a study in 2010, Lee et al. investigated the 
perception of sexual violence against women using a sample of 327 college students. In the study, Lee et al. found 
that in three of four models (rape survivor myths, rape perpetrator myths, myths about the impact of rape, and rape 
spontaneity myths), attitude towards women was the biggest predictor of rape myths (1200). This means that an 
individual’s opinion of women and their roles in society, home life, and academics determines his or her acceptance 
of rape myths, negating the influence of the individual’s gender and sexual double standards. This conclusion can 
further indicate that a societal opinion of women contributes vastly to the members’ acceptance of rape myths – the 
more traditional views of women in society correlate to a greater acceptance of rape myths. The core values of South 
Korea, determined through accomplished legislation, policies, and advocacies, influence its citizens’ acceptance of 
violence against women, which makes up the essence of rape culture – a culture that breeds and facilitates the social 
healing process of South Korean women. 
   The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) notes that sexual 
violence against women, including rape, domestic violence, and spousal rape, is still one of the most underreported 
crimes in South Korea (2007). Especially for domestic non-consensual rape, the Republic of Korea’s Universal 
Periodic Review states that victims may not be fully protected under the law due to the poor legal and institutional 
safeguards and an emphasis on counseling rather than prosecution of perpetrators, leading to only 14.9% domestic 
violence arrests in 2003 (2007). Legal infrastructure on the topic of sexual crimes include the 1994 Act on the 
Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims, an increase in the number of counseling centers from 12 to 
100 between the years 1995 to 2002, and the establishment of Hotlines (Congressional Research Service, The Violence 
Against Women Act: Overview Legislation, and Federal Funding).    
   In 2005, the Constitutional Court ruled that the hoju system was incompatible with legal provisions of gender 
equality.14 The influence of the women’s movement in the collapse of the hoju system indicates that a method of 
resilience has formed since the collective trauma of the comfort women. The Court ruling represented a breakage of 
the patriarchal barrier that was extremely fundamental to the silencing culture of South Korea. In a review manuscript 
for ecological and social healing of women, Pereira-Ares states that such breakage of discriminatory barriers indicates 
social healing for victims who witness changes to the culture that once stifled their testimonies, especially with 
enforcement of the Civil Code amendment that would eliminate the provisions of the family-head system.23 The 
removal of the hoju system has implications in the culture of sexual violence against women in the South Korea, or 
rape culture. Such social healing acts directly in correspondence with the silencing that had interfered with the 
reconciliation of collective trauma from the “comfort-hood system” during WWII. 
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   These reforms indicate that the movement against sexual violence has rapidly expanded within the past two decades, 
leading to policy resistance and international outreach. However, the leading actions for the reconciliation of the 
trauma of “comfort-hood” has not taken precedence in the South Korean government. 
 
6. Agenda for Action  
 
6. 1 Current Status  
 
In the last decade, the South Korean government has officially recognized the lack of victim voice in previous 
reconciliation processes. The government must now act to provide a new means of reparations for the tragedy during 
WWII. Based on effective methods of democratic reconciliation in Germany, the United States, and South Africa, the 
South Korean government may now facilitate actions toward long-term social healing.  
   The public rejection of the 2015 Agreement serves as one of the most recent case examples of how the modern South 
Korean population is pushing for a long-term social healing process rather than immediate remedy. In 2015, the 
Japanese government under Abe Shinzo and the Korean government under President Park Geunhye signed an 
agreement that included one final apology from the Prime Minister that recognized the responsibility by the Japanese 
Government, a donation of ¥1 billion, and the establishment of the Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing (FRH) 
in exchange for the removal of the “Peace Girl Statue” and the acknowledgement of the exchange as irreversible and 
final.18 The secret agreement was met with mass public outcry, prompting a formal rejection by the Korean Council 
and weekly protests, called Wednesday Protests, in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. These hostile reactions 
toward the 2015 agreement suggest that the people of Korea have opted for a long-term reconciliation process rather 
than a short-term monetary fund and written apology.  
   As a result, the South Korean government in 2018 created a review committee for 2015 agreement, rejected the 
agreement as a conclusion to reconciliation, and created an official Memorial Day for comfort women. However, the 
South Korean government has not made any renegotiations with Japan nor has it fully disbanded the Foundation of 
Reconciliation and Healing.3 In a 2016 study on the background of the 2015 Japan-Korea Agreement, however, 
Kumagai asserts that the South Korean government has currently lessened its initiatives to remove the “Peace Girl 
Statue.”17 The hesitance to reopen negotiations with Japan suggests that the South Korean government has not taken 
a stance on its next course of actions regarding the topic of comfort women. While the government has acknowledged 
the lack of victim voice in the 2015 Agreement, it has not provided further agendas on reconciliation, which prompts 
the topic of democratic processes for solutions.  
   The movement for the redress of comfort women stands in a nuanced yet delicate position for the South Korean 
government, taking into account both the formal rejection of the 2015 Agreement and contemporary international 
tensions. Kumagai states that the emphasized “irreversibility” of the 2015 Agreement, along with the explicit written 
apology, puts the Japanese-Korean relations regarding the issue of comfort women in a difficult position, in which 
one party must refrain from accusing or criticizing the other in the international community.17 Kwon comments on the 
usage of the “comfort women” issue in South Korea, in which the incidence of sexual slavery within WWII has 
furthered nationalistic values, rather than been used to address feministic and human rights values.18 Kumagai furthers 
the point by asserting that elements of dishonor, shame, image, and victimhood play on both sides of the negotiation, 
suggesting that the issue of comfort women must dissociate from the international tensions and evolve into a human 
rights issue that first seeks to clear misunderstandings and create solidarity within the South Korean population.17  
 
6. 2 Official Database for Victim Testimonies 
 
In a 2004 Washington University in St. Louis study of reconciliation in South Africa, Gibson claims that truth and 
reconciliation take on a complex relationship. The interlining of the two concepts are based on political and social 
constructionist psychology: specifically, the assumption that knowledge and the validation of that knowledge 
promotes forgiveness and, later, reconciliation.7 In a study of narrative healing among Greensboro victims of violence, 
Androff supports this psychological concept, stating that social work practice has incorporated narrative therapy into 
treatment for victims of violence as a means to facilitate the healing of individuals.2 The concept that victims and their 
testimonies, infused with public sympathy and validation, would allow for a cathartic release and recovery from 
trauma serves as a basis for “empowerment and strengths-based approaches.”2 Taken to a global perspective, Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) use and apply the concept of narrative therapy to marginalized groups to 
promote the reconciliation of a national entity. 
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   TRCs, while based on a logical psychology theory, lack the support of empirical studies regarding the impact of 
TRCs on generational and collective trauma within a nation. Stein et al. present one of the first studies that attempt to 
quantify the impact of TRCs in nations – in this case, South Africa. In 1998, South Africa established a TRC with the 
power to grant amnesty in the topic of the apartheid – government-sanctioned policy that discriminated against non-
whites – in order to foster consolidation in its transition to a democratic government. The TRC received approximately 
15,000 statements from victims and 7,000 applications for amnesty, granting 216 amnesties and dismissing others for 
denied guilt, personal gains, or extended jurisdiction.8 Six years after the TRC, Stein et al. surveyed a sample of around 
4,500 South African citizens to measure their attitudes toward the TRC. Stein et al. found that while narrative 
testimonies was not necessarily helpful to South African survivors of the Apartheid, the South African population as 
a whole held a moderately positive attitude towards the TRC. This suggests that TRCs provide, to a certain extent, 
knowledge and acknowledgement of a traumatic event in the past that can help to facilitate a reconciliation of the 
trauma for a community.26  
   The concept of TRCs come into play through the testimonies of former comfort women that began in 1991 with 
Kim Hak-Sun. Thus far, the government of South Korea has not formally established a database or collection of 
testimonies of the registered sexual military survivors, prompting independent organizations or national councils to 
provide their own platform for testimonies. Without a united platform, the main advocates for the reconciliation of 
comfort women become private or independent organizations based in South Korea or internationally.  South Korea’s 
plan for reconciliation should include a government-sponsored platform for testimonies of comfort women to establish 
validation for the truth of the past and provide a means of healing for the collective trauma passed through generations 
of women. 
 
6. 3 Government Partnership with Activist Organizations 
 
Reconciliation must encompass the cooperation between the South Korean government and women’s rights 
organizations. Such collaboration was evidenced in the process of reconciliation for the Japanese-American wartime 
internment camps in WWII. In a 2019 study of Japanese American wartime incarceration, Nagata et al. assess the 
long-term racial trauma of the approximately 33,000 Japanese Americans that suffered the discriminatory wartime 
incarceration during WWII, often called the Japanese internment camps.21 Describing the “radiating” effects of the 
mass incarceration, Nagata et al. claim that the formerly incarcerated Japanese Americans carried psychological 
burdens and unwarranted stigma from the racial imprisonment after the War’s end, contributing to a change in the 
group consciousness and social identity of the Japanese Americans generations to follow. Similar to the prevalence of 
shame within the group of comfort women, the Japanese Americans in post-incarceration faced humiliation, 
detachment, open hostility in treatment, and economic disadvantages from the American workplaces and communities 
that later enabled a “conspiracy of silence.” 21  
   Japanese American internment camp redress began with the 1980 Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians that assessed extensive documentation and gathered over 750 testimonies of witnesses across 
the country.21 Stating that the incarceration was a “grave injustice,” the Commission recommended that Congress 
issue a public apology with appropriate compensation, which was later implemented through Congress’s Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988. Nagata et al. state that although the commission was a critical portion of the redress success, 
the 40-year collective silence that preceded the commission led to feelings of disturbance that persisted across 
generation. The previously-suppressed Japanese American organizations continued the redress, working to repeal the 
Title II of the 1950 Internal Security Act, establishing the Japanese American National Museum, creating the Day of 
Remembrance ceremonies, facilitating race-informed clinical mode of trauma treatment, and endorsing of Japanese 
American communities. Similar to the way formal Japanese American organizations recruited and created a means of 
solidarity across the United States, the South Korean government should promote the women’s rights organizations 
in their actions for social healing. Such actions of the government would include, but are not limited to, endorsing the 
Korean Council as a special committee in the executive and legislative body representing the victims of the “comfort 
system,”  providing funds for the House of Sharing that houses the remaining living victims, and creating special 
forums for the voice of the organizations to filtrate through to the governmental body.  
 
6. 4 Education for Sexual Violence and Perception 
 
Another aspect of social healing is trauma education. In a 2006 case study of teaching traumatic history in Germany, 
Carrington and Short assessed the influence of Holocaust education on the perception of racism in secondary 
education. Carrington and Short found that education of traumatic history and biased narratives held significant 
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correlation with students’ ability to recognize and deconstruct stereotypes.5 Another study in 2002 recognized the 
implications of Holocaust education on cultural awareness and prejudice reduction in the school setting. Specifically, 
Burtonwood investigated the nature of contents and teaching methods for the Holocaust, stating that the national 
German curriculum allowed for the deconstruction of misconceptions about Jews and Judaism and indicated a need 
for further instruction on the sensitivity and method of education.4 
   Trauma education, regarding the issue of South Korean comfort women, translates to the education of the sexual 
violence culture towards women, stigmatization for victimhood, and rape myths in the growing population, 
particularly in the years prior to entering the general workforce. Rape myths prevail in four main categories: (1) Rape 
Perpetrator Myths, in which rape perpetrators are stereotyped with regard to their age, education, class, and marital 
status; (2) Rape Survivor Myths, in which women are held responsible for their rape; (3) Myths About the Impact of 
Rape, in which cultural myths regarding women’s virginity and chastity are emphasized; and (4) Rape Spontaneity 
Myths, in which rape occur spontaneously due to men’s uncontrollable sexual drive.20 These rape myths can be 
addressed through the availability and accessibility of encouraged sexual assault educational programs in South 
Korean college and universities. Coupled with a historical perspective of the former South Korean women through 
the database for testimonies, the sexual violence education programs serve as the foundation for correcting 
misconceptions for military sexual slavery and ongoing stigma for victims of sexual abuse and assault. The 
government implementation of such programs in diverse college settings would prompt a challenge to students’ 




This study examined the South Korean government’s role in the process of reconciliation for the inherited collective 
trauma of WWII comfort women, bringing cases for the cultural silencing of victims and the inherited impacts on the 
South Korean body. The presence of collective trauma has led to a disruption in the collective identity of a national 
entity, prompting a need for a new approach to a government-facilitated social healing process to end the former 
influence of patriarchal Confucianism and extend sexual violence governmental actions.  
   As of late 2019, the South Korean government holds a complex and indecisive stance on the topic of comfort women, 
with the latest official statement articulating a need for social healing yet refraining from further negotiations with the 
Japanese government. With a history of attempted reparations and over $9 million USD in donations from the AWF 
and the FRH, the South Korean government remains in a complicated position for future international conversations 
for legal and monetary reparations. Furthermore, the Council’s demand for a victim input in reconciliation efforts 
shines light on inefficient communication between sexual violence organizations and the government. Thus, the 
essence of the South Korean government’s next reconciliation approach must take a domestic approach that creates 
solidarity and resilience within the country, with intercontinental support and guidance. 
   Formal organizations, state-directed influences, and interorganizational networks are the three structural conditions 
necessary in this study’s proposal of a victim-centered approach. Specifically, state-directed legislation for the 
mandated education of sexual and rape violence educational programs, through an online or in-person platform, in the 
college setting will serve the educational pillar of the proposed approach. Such legislation must work in conjunction 
with sexual and genders discourse specialists and the database for victims of the WWII comfort system to build a 
research-driven curriculum for sexual violence towards women through the scope of history and current trauma. 
Additionally, a national committee that works with psychiatric and human rights practitioners to oversee the creation 
of a formal database for the collection of victim testimonies will allow for the open platform founded in the proposal. 
The committee would seek to publicize recollections of stories of former comfort women as a means of facilitating 
healing while avoiding re-traumatization among victims. The coordination of these structural sub-components will 
allow for the shift in the government’s focus from nationalistic goals and to endeavors of human rights and women’s 
rights.  
   Furthermore, the ability and willingness for the government to work with domestic and international women’s rights 
organizations for the inclusion of victim voices remain critical in the endeavor of reconciliation. Within the broader 
sociocultural context, the national resources, international guidance, and practical framing of the proposal must be 
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